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LEGISLATIVE SOVEREIGNTY, EXECUTIVE 
POWER, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: COMPARATIVE 
INSIGHTS FROM BREXIT 
René Reyes* 
INTRODUCTION 
In June 2016, participants in a United Kingdom referendum voted to 
leave the European Union (EU) by a margin of 52% to 48%.1 The timing and 
terms of Britain’s exit (commonly known as “Brexit”) are the subject of on-
going public and parliamentary debate. But the mechanism by which Brexit 
is to be formally commenced was clarified by the U.K. Supreme Court at the 
end of January 2017 in the landmark case R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union.2 The question presented was whether ministers 
of Theresa May’s government could give notice of the U.K.’s withdrawal 
from the EU “without prior legislation passed in both Houses of Parliament 
and assented to by HM The Queen.”3 The secretary of state argued that the 
power to withdraw was part of the royal prerogative exercisable by ministers 
without prior parliamentary action.4 However, in light of the far-reaching 
changes to domestic law that would result from terminating EU membership 
treaties, the court held that withdrawal “must be made in the only way in 
which the UK constitution permits, namely through Parliamentary legisla-
tion.”5 
On the one hand, the Miller decision may be seen as a resounding reaf-
firmation of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in British constitu-
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 2. [2017] UKSC 5 (appeal taken from N. Ir., Eng., and Wales), https://
www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0196-judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT7E-
2E2Z]. 
 3. Id. at [2]. 
 4. Id. at [5]. 
 5. Id. at [121]. 
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tional law. Notwithstanding the facts that a majority of voters supported 
Brexit and that government ministers ordinarily have the power to terminate 
treaties without legislative approval or judicial review,6 formal notice of 
withdrawal under Article 50 of the EU Treaties could not be given unless 
and until Parliament so agreed.7 Yet on the other hand, a comparative analy-
sis of Miller also reveals some significant limitations on parliamentary power 
in the United Kingdom relative to congressional power in the United 
States—even though Congress is constrained by the Constitution and enjoys 
no sovereignty over the other branches of government.8 This Essay explores 
these limitations on parliamentary power and argues that legislative sover-
eignty is best understood not as an immutable principle laid down in Brit-
ain’s constitutional history, but rather as an evolving ideal that continues to 
develop to this day. 
I. PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND EXECUTIVE POWER:  
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
For those whose understandings of legislative power are primarily in-
formed by the U.S. congressional model, the U.K. Supreme Court’s account 
of parliamentary sovereignty is likely to seem strikingly robust. The court 
noted that Parliament is one of the “three principal organs” of the U.K. gov-
ernment: the legislature, the executive (consisting of ministers rather than an 
independently elected president), and the judiciary.9 At first glance, Parlia-
ment would thus appear to occupy a similar role in constitutional structure 
to that held by Congress. But British constitutional history since the late 
1600s has evolved in such a way as to make Parliament’s role in government 
far more expansive than that of the other branches.10 The three branches of 
the U.K. government are not coequal as they are in the United States.11 To 
the contrary: “Parliamentary sovereignty is a fundamental principle of the 
UK constitution.”12 
 
 6. EU Referendum Results, supra note 1; see Miller, [2017] UKSC 5 at [55]. 
 7. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 8. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 9. Miller, [2017] UKSC 5 at [41]. 
 10. The court identifies the Bill of Rights of 1688, the Claim of Right Act of 1689, the 
Act of Settlement of 1701, and the Acts of Union of 1706 and 1707 as particularly significant 
legal milestones. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“In applying the prin-
ciple of separated powers in our jurisprudence, we have sought to give life to Madison’s view of 
the appropriate relationship among the three coequal Branches.”). 
 12. Miller, [2017] UKSC 5 at [43]. 
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How does this sovereignty operate in practice? With respect to domestic 
law, Parliament’s powers appear to be practically absolute. The court quoted 
A.V. Dicey for the proposition that Parliament may “make or unmake any 
law whatsoever; and further, no person or body is recognised by the law as 
having a right to override or set aside the legislation.”13 A necessary implica-
tion is that ministers of the government (who exercise executive powers and 
the administrative powers of the Crown) cannot exercise their own authority 
in a manner incompatible with parliamentary legislation.14 Nor can minis-
ters seek to undermine legislation through more indirect means, such as “by 
emptying it of content or preventing its effectual operation.”15 This plainly 
suggests that the equivalent of presidential “signing statements,” in which 
the executive might declare that certain provisions of a newly enacted statute 
are unconstitutional and need not be enforced as written, would have no 
place in U.K. law.16 
In the specific context of Brexit, the treaties by which the U.K. joined the 
European Union were implemented pursuant to an act of Parliament in 
1972, rather than by ministerial action alone.17 Moreover, the 1972 act made 
certain rights and rules from the EU directly applicable in the U.K.: “[I]ts ef-
fect is to constitute EU law an independent and overriding source of domes-
tic law.”18 Withdrawal from the European Union would effectively sever the 
“conduit pipe” through which EU law is imported into the U.K. and would 
therefore result in changes to domestic rights and responsibilities—areas of 
law that have traditionally been in Parliament’s purview.19 Given the princi-
ple of legislative sovereignty and the fact that the executive was merely the 
constitutional “junior partner” in the exercise of grafting EU law into U.K. 
law, the court concluded that ministers could not “subsequently remove the 
graft without formal appropriate sanction from the constitutionally senior 
partner in that exercise, Parliament.”20 
Despite this emphatic language about the scope of parliamentary sover-
eignty, Miller indicated that there are some important areas in which the ex-
ecutive retains a surprising degree of power relative to the legislature. For 
 
 13. Id. (quoting A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 38 (8th ed. 1915)). 
 14. Id. at [45]. 
 15. Id. at [51]. 
 16. For discussion and analysis of signing statements in U.S. law, see, for example, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS DOCTRINE (2006); Symposium, The Last Word? The Constitutional Implications of 
Presidential Signing Statements, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2007). 
 17. Miller, [2017] UKSC 5 at [13]–[15]. 
 18. Id. at [65]. 
 19. For discussion of the “conduit pipe” metaphor, see id. at [65], [80]. 
 20. Id. at [90]. 
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example, the court suggested in several places that Brexit presents an excep-
tion to “the general rule . . . that the power to make or unmake treaties is ex-
ercisable without legislative authority and that the exercise of that power is 
not reviewable by the courts.”21 One of the main explanations for this gen-
eral rule is that the U.K. follows a dualist system of foreign relations in which 
the treaty power is understood to involve an exercise in international rather 
than domestic law.22 The court goes so far as to note that the power to make 
treaties that do not change domestic law has long been “unfettered” in prin-
ciple, even if ministers have generally presented treaties to Parliament for re-
view as a matter of convention since the late nineteenth century.23 
A similarly significant qualification to the idea of parliamentary sover-
eignty may be found in the power of ministers to declare war.24 The court 
recognized that the exercise of this prerogative may have significant conse-
quences in domestic law, but nonetheless describes the power to declare war 
as one “by [its] very nature at least normally best reserved to ministers.”25 
Parliament itself would seem to agree. The U.K. government published a 
consultation document in 2007 raising the question of whether the current 
constitutional arrangement should be modified to give Parliament a greater 
role in declaring war and deploying armed forces.26 However, no such modi-
fication was included in the ensuing parliamentary legislation.27 
These exceptions to parliamentary power are all the more notable when 
compared to congressional power in corresponding areas. Unlike Parlia-
ment, which may pass law on almost any subject whatsoever,28 Congress 
 
 21. Id. at [55], [92] (“[I]t has always been considered that . . . prerogative treaty-making 
powers are not subject to judicial review . . . .”). 
 22. Id. at [55]–[56]. 
 23. Id. at [58]. This practice has become known as the “Ponsonby Convention.” For fur-
ther discussion of the convention and the extent to which it has been superseded by statute, see 
infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 24. Miller, [2017] UKSC 5 at [47] (citing H.W.R. WADE & C.F. FORSYTH, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1st ed. 1961)). 
 25. Id. at [49], [52]–[53]. 
 26. See LORD CHANCELLOR AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE, THE GOVERNANCE 
OF BRITAIN—ANALYSIS OF CONSULTATIONS, 2008, Cm. 7342-III (Gr. Brit.), https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/250907/7342_iii.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UCT3-QXW3] (discussing the various responses to questions about Parlia-
ment’s role in the deployment of armed forces); SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE AND LORD 
CHANCELLOR, THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN—WAR POWERS AND TREATIES: LIMITING 
EXECUTIVE POWERS, 2007, Cm. 7239 (Gr. Brit.), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243164/7239.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K6F-K8DN] [here-
inafter LIMITING EXECUTIVE POWERS]. 
 27. See Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, c. 25 (UK). 
 28. See Miller, [2017] UKSC 5 at [43]. 
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may legislate only pursuant to constitutionally enumerated powers and with-
in constitutionally prescribed limits.29 These constitutional limits are, of 
course, enforceable through judicial review.30 But at the same time, Congress 
is also constitutionally empowered to exercise greater authority than Parlia-
ment presently does in key areas of law—in particular, with respect to trea-
ties and declarations of war. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution explicitly provides 
that the president’s power to make treaties is to be exercised “by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate,” and requires that treaties be ratified by 
the Senate as a matter of constitutional law rather than as a matter of histori-
cal convention.31 The Constitution also expressly vests the power to declare 
war and to raise and support armies with Congress.32 To be sure, the Consti-
tution also names the president as commander in chief of the armed forces.33 
This division of authority with respect to military matters has led to occa-
sional conflict between the legislative and executive branches about their re-
spective powers,34 but it remains clear that Congress plays an integral consti-
tutional role in this arena. 
Importantly, many of these comparative limitations on parliamentary 
power relative to congressional power could be modified or abolished if Par-
liament so decided. Government ministers invited discussion several years 
ago on whether the convention of presenting treaties to Parliament for re-
view should be strengthened, and Parliament subsequently passed the Con-
stitutional Reform and Governance Act of 2010.35 U.K. law now provides 
that treaties will not be ratified before Parliament has had an opportunity to 
scrutinize them.36 As noted above, Parliament declined to act on a similar 
proposal to amplify its constitutional role in declaring war—but it surely 
would have been within its power to include such a change in the same act.37 
 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (striking down federal 
Gun-Free School Zones Act as beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and not-
ing that to accept the government’s position “would require us to conclude that the Constitu-
tion’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated”). 
 30. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2. 
 34. See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012). 
 35. Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, c. 25 (UK). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See R (Miller) v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, [48] 
(appeal taken from N. Ir., Eng., and Wales), https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-
2016-0196-judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT7E-2E2Z] (“[C]onsistently with Parliamentary 
sovereignty, a prerogative power however well-established may be curtailed or abrogated by 
statute.”). 
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This does not mean that the executive’s treaty and war powers are be-
stowed by or derived from Parliament.38 Rather, they are “the residue of 
powers which remain vested in the Crown” after hundreds of years of British 
history.39 Nor does it mean that Parliament’s decision not to abrogate the 
powers of the executive is a mere formalism. Ministers have exercised the 
treaty and war powers for many years, and this will remain an established 
feature of British constitutional law unless Parliament acts to change the dy-
namic. But it does suggest that the scope of parliamentary power is an evolv-
ing rather than a fixed concept. Miller is another step in that evolution. The 
next Part briefly considers the role played by the U.K. Supreme Court in this 
evolutionary process, and some of the ways in which parliamentary sover-
eignty may continue to manifest itself in the near future. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 
While the focus of Miller (and this Essay) is on the powers of the legisla-
ture, the U.K. Supreme Court’s opinion also yields noteworthy comparative 
insights about the role of the courts and judicial review. As is the case in the 
United States, the judiciary in the United Kingdom is a constitutionally in-
dependent branch of government.40 Yet an independent judicial branch is 
not the same thing as a constitutionally coequal branch. The Miller court did 
observe that “the role of the judiciary is to uphold and further the rule of 
law,” and that there are even “areas where the law has long been laid down 
and developed by judges themselves: that is the common law.”41 Like statu-
tory law, common law cannot be changed or infringed by ministers.42 But 
the judiciary’s lawmaking role is limited by principles of parliamentary sov-
ereignty: “[I]t is not open to judges to apply or develop the common law in a 
way which is inconsistent with the law as laid down in or under statutes, i.e. 
by Acts of Parliament.”43 Whereas it has long been “emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is” in the United 
States, the same is not necessarily true for the judicial department in the 
U.K.—at least not when Parliament says otherwise.44 
 
 38. LIMITING EXECUTIVE POWERS, supra note 26, at 7 (noting that treaty and war pow-
ers “which are exercised by Ministers are not conferred by Parliament,” and that “there is no 
codified Parliamentary procedure which prescribes how Parliament should have a say in how 
they are exercised”). 
 39. Miller, [2017] UKSC 5 at [47]. 
 40. Id. at [42]. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 41. Miller, [2017] UKSC 5 at [42]. 
 42. Id. at [45], [50]. 
 43. Id. at [45]. 
 44. Id.; cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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The U.K. judiciary may thus be said to be comparatively weaker than the 
U.S. judiciary vis-à-vis the legislature. Nevertheless, the U.K. Supreme Court 
does play a significant role in developing and upholding constitutional prin-
ciples. Miller itself is an important example. Britain’s departure from the EU 
represents “a far-reaching change to the UK constitutional arrangements,”45 
and it was ultimately left to the Supreme Court to resolve the uncertainty 
surrounding the respective powers of ministers and Parliament to trigger 
Brexit. Despite the momentous and potentially polarizing nature of the case, 
the court emphasized that no one seriously questioned the appropriateness 
of a judicial determination of the issues presented.46 Theresa May’s govern-
ment accepted the court’s decision and promptly presented a bill before Par-
liament.47 
In addition, the U.K. Supreme Court arguably enjoys more independ-
ence and flexibility than the U.S. Supreme Court in some respects. U.K. jus-
tices are not subject to legislative confirmation,48 and so are spared the high-
ly politicized battles that characterize U.S. Supreme Court nominations.49 An 
oft-asserted argument in these political battles is that U.S. judges should in-
terpret the Constitution according to its original meaning to provide stability 
in the law and to guard against judicial lawmaking.50 But U.K. justices are 
free to unabashedly acknowledge that they are not bound by originalism or 
any other fixed theories of constitutional interpretation, and to note the role 
played by the judiciary in the evolution of British constitutional law. As the 
 
 45. Miller, [2017] UKSC 5 at [81]. 
 46. Id. at [3]. 
 47. See European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017, HC Bill [132] (UK). 
 48. For an overview of the U.K. appointment process and statutory references, see Ap-
pointments of Justices, SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/appointments-of-
justices.html [https://perma.cc/Y8WV-VZ2H]. 
 49. The situation in the United States has become so politicized that President Obama’s 
final nominee to the Supreme Court was never even given a hearing by the Senate, and Presi-
dent Trump’s nominee was confirmed only after the Senate invoked the so-called “nuclear op-
tion” that ended the filibuster for Supreme Court appointments. See Matt Flegenheimer, Senate 
Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html 
[https://perma.cc/B7NJ-FFJB]. 
 50. For discussion of originalism and recently-confirmed Justice Neil Gorsuch, see, for 
example, Aaron Blake, Neil Gorsuch, Antonin Scalia and Originalism, Explained, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/01/neil-gorsuch-
antonin-scalia-and-originalism-explained/?utm_term=.29373bfa1bcc [https://perma.cc/
6MBH-4YCA]; Adam Liptak, In Judge Neil Gorsuch, an Echo of Scalia in Philosophy and Style, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-
supreme-court-nominee.html [https://perma.cc/R4C2-KW9B]; Ed Pilkington, Originalism: 
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majority stated in Miller, “Our constitutional arrangements have developed 
over time in a pragmatic as much as in a principled way, through a combina-
tion of statutes, events, conventions, academic writings and judicial deci-
sions.”51 This pragmatism allows even fundamental principles like parlia-
mentary sovereignty to adapt and develop in light of changing circumstances 
in a more candid and transparent manner than might be the case under 
more rigid jurisprudential approaches. 
CONCLUSION 
Where might parliamentary sovereignty go from here? Miller and the 
larger Brexit debate suggest a few possibilities. The court noted that the form 
of legislation authorizing ministers to give formal notice of Britain’s depar-
ture “is entirely a matter for Parliament,” and that such legislation “could no 
doubt be very short indeed.”52 The government responded by bringing forth 
a bill consisting of a mere two clauses and less than 150 words.53 This bill 
would largely leave the details of Brexit negotiations to ministers, which ac-
cords with the traditional U.K. constitutional practice of leaving the power 
to withdraw from treaties with the government. Although the proposed bill 
passed through the House of Commons in its original form, it was amended 
in the House of Lords to require parliamentary approval of the terms of Brit-
ain’s departure.54 The House of Commons overrode these amendments and 
the Lords relented,55 but some peers have continued to press for greater par-
liamentary involvement in the Brexit process.56 Other voices have warned of 
potential further legal action to guarantee an opportunity for a final vote in 
Parliament on the details of Britain’s future relationship with the EU.57 
 
 51. Miller, [2017] UKSC 5 at [40]. 
 52. Id. at [122]. 
 53. See European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017, HC Bill [132] (UK). 
 54. See Lords Amendments to the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 
2017, HL Bill [152] cl. 2 (UK). The amendments would also require ministers to produce plans 
to protect the rights of EU nationals currently living legally in the U.K. Id. at cl. 1. 
 55. Anushka Asthana et al., Parliament Passes Brexit Bill and Opens Way to Triggering 
Article 50, GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2017, 6:12 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/
mar/13/brexit-vote-article-50-eu-citizens-rights-lords-mps [https://perma.cc/P5C6-KYHX]. 
 56. See Joe Watts, Theresa May Faces New Challenge from House of Lords Over Brexit, 
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 16, 2017, 12:45 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/
brexit-latest-theresa-may-article-50-a7633106.html [https://perma.cc/U5VX-JA4S]. 
 57. Rob Merrick, Theresa May Warned That Brexit Is “Heading Back to the Courts” Af-
ter She Refuses to Give MPs a “Meaningful Vote”, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 13, 2017, 7:04 PM), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-est-article-50-theresa-may-
meaningful-vote-lords-eu-nationals-a7628206.html [https://perma.cc/V4GG-W5A4]; Joe 
Watts, Gina Miller Warns Theresa May of New Court Battle If Parliament Not Guaranteed Vote 
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It thus appears likely that Parliament will come to play a more active 
role with respect to treaty powers and foreign affairs in the near future. This 
result is not compelled by constitutional text, precedent, or original mean-
ing. Nor is it a necessary corollary of parliamentary sovereignty—for minis-
ters have long been the dominant actors in foreign relations without posing a 
threat to the constitutional primacy of the legislature. It is rather a manifes-
tation of the British system’s capacity for growth and evolution in response 
to changing circumstances. Hence, while Parliament may exert its sovereign-
ty in foreign affairs during the unique constitutional climate presented by 
Brexit, it will not necessarily do so with respect to other matters of interna-
tional law. Particularly when compared with the more rigid and enduring 
structural elements of the U.S. Constitution, this adaptability suggests that 
the U.K. Constitution may indeed be “the most flexible polity in existence.”58 
 
 
on Leaving EU, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 1, 2017, 6:15 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/politics/brexit-latest-gina-miller-article-50-theresa-may-court-case-three-knights-opinion-
a7606346.html [https://perma.cc/9D28-C44G]. 
 58. R (Miller) v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5, [40] 
(appeal taken from N. Ir., Eng., and Wales) (quoting A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 87 (8th ed., 1915)), https://www.supremecourt.uk/
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